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ABSTRACT 
In a set of articles in the 1974 American Political Science Review, 
Philip Converse and Jerrold Rusk offered an institutional, and Walter Dean 
Burnham, a behavioral explanation of the decline in voter turnout in the 
Northern United States around the turn of the century. An examination of 
turnout figures for New York state from 1870 to 1916 demonstrates that election 
statistics lend some support to both theories, and that the elections around the 
year 1890 provide the strongest evidence in favor of the Converse-Rusk 
hypothesis. A systematic analysis of election-related stories in contemporary 
newspapers allows a test of Converse's assertion that the introduction of the 
secret ballot decreased reported turnout by damping down what he alleges was 
widespread rural corruption. Concluding that neither previous theory stands up 
well when confronted with the detailed voting figures and newspaper evidence, we 
propose an alternative explanation which melds the institutional and behavioral 
hypotheses. 
In a lengthy and sometimes heated exchange in the American 
Political Science Review in 1974, Walter Dean Burnham, Philip E. Converse, 
and Jerrold G. Rusk clashed over two topics which have long been matters 
of debate among political scientists: the role of legal institutions 
in shaping human behavior, and the generalizability to other populations 
of findings based on a particular method and drawn from a specific place 
or era. 1 Nine years earlier, Burnham had challenged the American 
Voter's survey-based portrait of the United States electorate by 
compiling, from aggregate electoral data, five indices of late nineteenth-
century American voters' involvement in politics. Contending that these 
earlier Americans were much more interested in and seemingly informed 
about politics than their mid-twentieth century counterparts, Burnham 
asserted that the overwhelming 1896 McKinley victory and the succeeding 
political hegemony of major business interests had alienated previously 
active lower-class voters from the electoral system by robbing them of 
a real and effective alternative to corporate domination. Exogenous 
events -- the decline in the non-Southern opposition to the Republicans 
and a capitalist takeover of the GOP -- had caused a shift in the 
pattern of electoral participation. 2 
Converse and Rusk countered with the argument that different 
exogenous events produced legal changes which in turn caused apparent 
alterations in behavior. Aiming only to reduce corruption and free 
individuals to express their political opinions fully, Mugwumps and 
Progressives, according to Converse and Rusk, introduced strict 
registration and Australian ballot laws. Such laws decreased fraud 
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and bribery, and raised the cost of vot ing above the level which many 
peripherally-concerned citizens were willing to pay, thereby reducing 
reported turnout but leaving as active electors a better informed and 
more involved population. Further, the secret ballot facilitated 
ticket-splitt ing, which made the vote a more accurate expression of 
opinion, and damaged party machines, who could no longer drill electors 
to the polls, confident that they were marshalling reliable straight-
t icket automatons. Far from a golden era, fin de siecle politics was 
a period when fraud and unt hinking passion swelled electoral totals, and 
the changes Burnham described were either benign intended consequences 
of the acts of well-meaning reformers, such as t he reduction in fraud-
inflated t urnout and the increasing selectivity which the publicly-
printed blanket ballot allowed, or unintended consequences of the 
reforms, such as the increased difficulty of voting, which discouraged 
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lower-class participation. 
In t he ensuing interchange, Burnham amended his position by 
adding changes in registration and ballot laws to the complex of causes 
of the dislocation of the political universe, but reserved priorit y in 
that complex for "behavioral" causes. Converse and Rusk, on the other 
hand, attributed virtually the entire shift in the practices of the 
non-Southern electorate to the "legal-institutional" factors, and in 
any case considered t hat shift much less important than Burnham did. 
In this paper, we will bring new evidence to bear on this cont roversy, 
propose a hypothesis which draws from both the "behavioral" and 
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"legal-institutional" frameworks, and suggest lines for future research. 
We shall focus on the most important component of Burnham's indicat ors 
of systemic change, voter turnout, and devote most of our attention t o  
Converse' s view that changes in what he contends was widespread rural 
corruption explain a great deal of the alteration in turnout. 
New York was the most populous state in t he nation in 1890, 
t he center of t ransportation, COllDllunications, illDlligration, and 
manufact uring, one of t he four most highly competitive states in the 
1876-92 presidential contests, and t he home of a major part y 
presidential or vice-presidential candidat e in each of those five 
elect ions. It was also one of t he four stat es on which Burnham 
focused in his 1974 article. Containing 13 percent of t he adult males 
outside t he Confederate Sout h in 1890, New York is the single most 
important state from which t o  draw generalizat ions about the ninet eenth -
century non-Southern electorate. 
The trends in presidential and gubernatorial t urnout over a 
thirty-six year period in New York state lend some support to each 
t heory. 4 Major changes in the stat e's elect ion laws came in 1890, 1895, 
1908, and 1913. In 1890, an official party-column style Aust ralian 
ballot was int roduced throughout the state to replace the non-official 
ballot s which had previously been distributed by the political parties. 
In cities, registration which necessitated personal application by t he 
voter before each election replaced the "non-personal" regist ration 
system, in which anyone who voted was aut omatically registered for the 
next election. Non-personal registration was expanded to apply not 
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only to large villages, which had previously been covered, but also to 
all other areas (small villages, towns, and rural areas), where 
registration had not previously been mandatory. Five years later in 
1895, personal, periodic registration was extended to villages above 
5000 in population. In 1908, voters in Greater New York City were 
required to sign the registration list before each election and countersign 
when they voted. Finally, in 1913 the party-column ballot gave way to an 
office-bloc ballot. 5 
A look at Figure 1 shows large turnout decreases from 1888 to 
1892 and 1904 to 1908 (both drops of 5. 6 percent in the presidential vote), 
which support the Rusk-Converse institutional argument, but also 
declines of 4.7 percent from 1900 to 1904 and 6. 1 percent from 1908 to 
1912, which tend to uphold a noninstitutional argument, though perhaps not 
Burnham' s "elite capture" model. It may well be that the three-way 1912 
presidential and gubernatorial contests so crbss-pressured and disheartened 
Republican voters and party organizations that they failed to participate 
despite the broader range of choices open to them in those contests. The 
lack of a substantial decline in 1896 and 1900 does seem to favor Burnham's 
view, for, as long as William Jennings Bryan headed the Democratic 
ticket, large corporations could not be said to have captured both 
parties. 
But not all adult males could legally vote in New York 
during this period, and since the proportion of eligible foreign-
born voters did not stay constant, the use of all adult males in 
the denominator of the turnout figures introduces a distortion 
into the trend. Figure 2 corrects the denominator to eliminate 
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those foreign-born citizens who were not legally eligible to vote, and 
presents a somewhat different portrait of New York voting behavior. 6 
Most obviously, estimated turnout in figure 2 was higher and the 
decline less steep. In 1876, for instance, figure 1 presidential 
turnout was 78. 3 percent, figure 2, 87 percent; in 1916, figure 1 
presidential turnout was 55. 3 percent, figure 2, 70. 9 percent. 
Increased immigration thus produced a difference in the two estimates 
of turnout decline. The figure 1 presidential decline from 1876 to 
1916 was 23 percent, compared to 16. 1 percent for figure 2, a 
difference of 6. 9 percent, which is as large as the difference between 
any pair of presidential elections. 
Then, too, the figure 2 level of turnout at the end of the 
period, while not nearly so high as that at the beginning, was still 
very respectable, still considerably above nationwide levels in the 
1970s. The notions of an "elite takeover" or a large-scale decline 
in corrupt voting seem somewhat less tenable when applied to an 
electorate in which 71 percent of those eligible to register still 
voted than to one where the turnout was 55 percent. Furthermore, the 
figure 2 presidential estimates provide somewhat reduced support for 
Rusk and Converse and a bit more than those of figure 1 for Burnham. 
Although the 1890 registration and secret-ballot laws still left their 
impress on the figures, the effect of the 1908 change was somewhat 
less marked (a 3. 2 percent presidential decline from 1904 to 1908 for 
figure 2, instead of the 5. 6 percent figure for figure 1). And the 
1908 to 1912 change, which has no ready "institutional" intepretation, 
is comparatively magnified in figure 2. Whereas in figure 1, the 
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1908-16 presidential difference represented 23 percent of the total 
1876-1916 decline, it accounted for 41 percent of the forty-year 
change for figure 2. The overall point to be drawn from the two 
graphs is that small det ails in computing such estimates make a good 
deal of difference in choosing between competing hypotheses. 
Since changes in registration requirement s  were not uniform, 
however, we must go below the state to the county level to obtain 
7 better t ests of the two theories. In figure 3 and table 1, we 
concent rate on the 21 (of a tot al of 59) New York counties which 
were either all urban or all rural, and thus either maximally or 
minimally covered by registration statutes. 8 Six features of figure 3 
and t able 1 deserve comment. First , regardless of changes in ballot 
or registration laws or part y compet ition, presidential turnout up to 
1900 was quite high. Even using all adult males in the denominator -­
count y census figures which would allow an estimate of "cit izens" do 
not exist before 1900 -- presidential t urnout in the eight elections 
from 1872 to 1900 averaged 88. 5 percent in the rural and 66. 0 percent 
in the urban count ies. Second, about half of the difference bet ween 
urban and rural turnout was merely an artifact of our inabilit y to 
estimate the number of citizens accurately before 1900, and had 
nothing to do with the effect of different registration laws. The 
difference in rural and urban president ial t urnout in that year using 
all males in the denominator was 19. 9 percent; but because there were 
more unnaturalized foreigners in cit ies than on farms, t he difference 
using the cit izenship estimate was only 10. 1 percent . 
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Third, the remaining differences between urban and rural 
voting part icipat ion could be credited to either institut ional or 
behavioral factors. Converse and Rusk might stress the fact that 
throughout the period registration laws were considerably less st ringent 
in t he farm counties than in the cities. The divergence in requirements, 
they might contend, inhibited voting and (at least before the 1890 
secret ballot) vote-buying in the rural areas less than in t he 
met ropolises; hence, the contrast in turnout . Burnham could point out 
that t he mean difference in rural and urban gubernat orial turnout 
(using all adult males in t he denominators) was 19. 7 percent from 
1870-88, but st ill 17. 6 percent from 1891-1900, which he might assert 
indicates that t here was only a minor amount of corruption for the 
secret ballot to eliminate. The remaining difference, he could well 
assert, demonstrates that in the nineteenth-century polit ical universe, 
in contrast to t hat of today, rural vot ers were more involved in 
politics than were their city cousins. 
Fourt h, t he largest change in presidential turnout during 
the period was the urban decline after 1900, which was nearly three 
t imes as large as the rural decline in t he same elections. Fifth, 
when we turn to the gubernatorial data, we find somewhat larger urban 
decreases, but considerably greater rural changes t han in the 
presidential cont ests. The rat io of urban to rural declines goes 
from 2.9 in the presidential to 1. 2 in the gubernat orial races, using 
t he citizenship estimate in the denominators (see t able 2). Both 
inst itut ional and noninst itut ional factors cont ributed to these 
declines. At least part of t he urban decline might be att ributed to 
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the double-signature registration requirement in Greater New York 
from 1908 on. The difference between presidential and gubernatorial 
turnout, negligible before 1912, rose to 4.7 percent in rural areas 
in that year, and, after the switch from a party column to an office-
bloc ballot in 1913, rose to 3. 7 percent in urban and 9. 8 percent in 
rural counties (see table 3). But the split between progressive and 
machine Republicans during the last part of Governor Charles Evans 
Hughes's 1908-10 term, and especially the deepening of that split with 
the formation of the Progressive party in 1912 undoubtedly reduced 
Republican party activity in getting out the vote and marking a 
9 straight ticket. This decline in organizational activity no doubt 
had a particularly large effect in the heavily Republican rural 
counties. The 1900-16 declines would thus seem to fit Burnham's 
"party decomposition" thesis, at least for the Republicans, better 
than his "elite capture" model. IO 
The sixth point is that, despite being overshadowed by the 
1900-1916 decline, the decrease from 1888 to 1891-92 was still 
considerable and has no apparent behavioral explanation. The vote 
declined by 7. 9 percent in rural and 3. 9 percent in urban areas between 
1888 and 1892, despite the fact that the two presidential contestants 
were identical in both races. The 1888-91 gubernatorial decline, no 
doubt partly due to the fact that the latter election was held in a 
nonpresidential year, was even more dramatic: 25. 5 percent in rural 
and 11. 2 percent in urban areas. Since the major inter-election 
changes in these years were not in personalities or programs, but in 
streng thened registration requirements and the introduction of the 
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official ballot, any behavioral explanation would seem to be ruled out. 
Moreover, if we separate the returns from Brooklyn and New York counties 
where the same registration law governed from 1866 to 1908, from those 
in other urban areas, in which registration procedures were stiffened 
in 1890, the contrast is less striking than that between country and 
city, but still noticeable. In Brooklyn and New York counties, the 
declines in gubernatorial and presidential turnout from 1888 to 1891 
and 1892, respectively, were 10. 7 percent and 3. 4 percent; in other 
urban areas, the decreases were 12. 6 percent and 5. 0 percent. Do 
these declines, concentrated especially in the rural areas, substantiate 
the Rusk-Converse thesis that the instirutional change to a secret 
ballot and stricter registration laws reduced turnout by decreasing 
rural corruption? 
Corruption in the electorate is a much discussed, but rarely 
studied subject. Articles and parts of books written around the turn of 
the century were biased, unsystematic, and based largely on hearsay 
11 evidence gathered after the fact. Although contemporary legislative 
investigations of fraud in contested elections cases and public hearings 
triggered by general allegations of vote-buying were often more meticulous, 
they took place only sporadically, usually when the alleged frauds were 
large enough to overturn an electoral result, and were inherently biased, 
since the lawyers for each side were more interested in making a case for 
their clients than in dispassionately uncovering facts. Convers e's 
rather offhand remarks on rural corruption are rounded either on unspecified 
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"contemporary accounts" or the views of unnamed "observe'rs of the 
period," or on his own purely a priori assumption that 5-10 percent 
of nineteenth century rural voters were corrupt, which he claims 
several unnamed "historian friends" of his were "less willing to doubt" 
than they were to question the existence of "massive" rural frauds.12
As Converse notes, the "true rate of fraud" at the turn of 
the century "can probably never be reconstructed . . . ,.13 Still, it is 
possible to make a systematic and relatively unbiased study of trends 
in the level and form of rural electoral corruption, and we have 
attempted the task by examining references to rural electoral fraud 
in New York state in 48 of the state's newspapers over ten election 
periods from 1879 to 1908. To overcome the sporadic and impressionistic 
nature of such reports we cast a wide and lengthy research net, and 
to counteract the bias of individual papers and reporters we tried to 
balance the partisan persuasions and geographical locations of the 
sources (see table 4). 14 
The newspaper stories on electoral corruption varied widely 
in tone, content, and specificity. They could be utterly vague and 
general, such as Democratic presidential candidate Samuel J. Tilden's 
1876 statement that "The improper and illegal use of money at elections 
is in some portions of this state a serious and growing evil. 
,.15 
They could be transparently partisan, such as a Republican paper's 
1885 pre-election admonition to the party faithful to be vigilant 
because "The Democrats know they cannot carry the county except by 
fraud . " or a Democratic paper's 1892 prediction that "never in the 
history of the Republican party will corruption and money play its 
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part more scandalously than in the present campaign. ,,16 There were 
also partisan denials of fraud, such as a Democratic paper's rather half-
hearted response to a Republican charge: "The Courier says the defeat of 
the Republican ticket 'was accomplished by the open use of an unlimited 
corruption fund. ' Nothing is easier to charge than the use of money in a 
17 campaign; but it is often very difficult to prove." There were even 
defenses of fraud, as, for example, one by Congregationalist minister 
Thomas K. Beecher, brother of Harriet Beecher Stowe and of the nation's 
most popular preacher, Henry Ward Beecher: 
When a good man for a good purpose buys the vote of a fellow man, 
the voter � being a principal and a sovereign � is free to do as 
he chooses; the act is right. The buyer is no briber in the court 
of conscience, not at the bar of God, except he have an intent to 
pervert the judgment. And the humble-minded voter who accepts the 
gift and guidance of the good man aforesaid is obeying motives 
manlier and more nearly safe than those which ordinarily sway our 
more active and enthusiastic voters. 18
To express Beecher's view in the terms of recent political science, 
bribers were merely "opinion leaders" performing their public duty and 
bribe-takers, rational profit-maximizers seeking to reduce their 
information costs and add a positive term to the right-hand-sides of their 
19 voting calculus equations. 
Just as they printed market reports on the prices of hogs 
and corn, so the papers, from time to time, published quotations on 
votes. The franchise went for up to $25 in Ulster County in 1880, 
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20for $10 to $27 in Elmira in 1885, for up to $15 in Middletown in 1892. 
Other stories discussed free transportation to the polls, the use of 
repeaters, the illegal naturalization of foreigners, the election-day 
importation of voters from other states, the padding of registration 
rolls, fraudulent counting, and, most interestingly, payments to 
citizens not to vote. We counted and characterized all references to 
corruption in upstate towns and rural areas. 21 
The fundamental flaw in Converse's argument is his assumption 
22 that corruption always inflated turnout. Before the days of 
scientific polling, the parties took polls, especially in close states, 
and instead of sampling, they often questioned virtually every voter 
in an area. In one district in Clinton County in 1888, for instance, 
the Democratic canvassers went from house to house and counted 121 
sure-Republican, 101 sure-Democrat, and 401 "doubtful" voters.23 In 
such circumstances, party managers had sufficient information to follow 
a policy of not only paying "floaters" to cast ballots for their 
parties, but also of rewarding opponents for not voting. In any 
system in which the practice of providing financial incentives for. 
electoral performance was widespread, moreover, it would be rational 
for voters to conceal or lie about their preferences or to seek 
remuneration even for voting for their preferred candidates.  There 
is evidence that late nineteenth-century New York voters played 
exactly this game. As one newspaper noted in 1888, "There are 
thousands of voters in both parties who wait in every important 
election to be paid, even to vote the ticket of their choice. A high 
Democratic authority has placed this number at one-third in each 
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party in many sections of the State."24 
With the introduction of the secret ballot in 1890, the 
strategic alternatives facing the political managers suddenly shifted. 
No longer could a manager watch each voter openly drop his easily 
distinguished party ticket into a ballot box. Although curtains might 
thereafter shroud the bought voter's delivery on his promise, 
politicos could still observe the actions of an avowed or probable 
opponent who was paid to abstain. .The voter's incentives in the pre-
election canvass changed, too, for it was now in his interest to 
declare a partisan position openly and then bargain with the opposition. 25 
Thus, assuming that voters and managers were rational, one would predict 
that the institutional change from an identifiable party ballot to a 
secret ballot would lead to a behavioral shift in the nature, but not 
necessarily in the extent of electoral corruption. 26 
The newspapers noticed this change, and, in fact, it was our 
reading of the New York Times for successive election periods which 
first suggested these models to us, and which led us to broaden our 
initial research in that paper to include a much larger number of 
journals. The Democratic Times's reports were quite explicit. In 
1890, the paper noted that "under the old system of voting . . .  the 
Republican Party spent money to increase the Republican vote. Now 
they are using their corruption fund to decrease the Democratic vote. " 
By 1894, the practice had become institutionalized: "Politicians 
from some sections of the state speak of the cost of keeping people 
at home on election day as if it were part of the 'legitimate campaign 
expenses.' . . •  Corruption of this sort is spoken of as if it were 
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to be expected, and excites no more cormnent than would a mild epidemic 
of measles. "  Nor were the Republicans the sole practitioners of this 
deception, for it was a Democratic st ate chairman who noted in 1900 
that "Under t he new ballot law you cannot tell how a man votes when 
he goes int o t he booth, but if he stays at home you know that you have 
27 got the worth of your money. " 
Tables 5 and 6, based on the whole sample of papers, demon-
strate t hat the Times was not alone in noticing such changes, and 
confirm our predictions rat her nicely. Table 5 presents the number 
of events (we have sought to eliminate duplicated reports of the same 
event) for each year, and t able 6 groups the events in t able 5 for the 
28 
periods before and after the passage of the secret-ballot law. 
Rarely mentioned before 1890, explicitly deflationary fraud mushroomed 
to a quarter of the total after t hat date, and t he number of events 
reported in which the nature of the chicanery was unspecified, a 
category which undoubtedly included instances of deflationary fraud, 
approximately doubled. Inflationary fraud continued to be reported 
at about t he same level, but references to it made up a strikingly 
smaller proportion of the total volume of events after t han before 
1890. Chi-square stat istics for the full 3x2 t able and for the five 
2x2 sub-tables in table 6 formed by deleting or collapsing various 
rows all show that the before-and-after patterns were very unlikely 
t o  have occurred by chance. Moreover, if the ballot reformers sought 
to decrease corruption, they apparently failed, for t he total number 
of corrupt event s reported was considerably higher in the four secret-
ballot than in t he four party-ballot elections. While it is possible 
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that t he rise from 131 to 215 events chronicled was due more to 
intensified reporting on t he subject t han to a rise in corruption, 
the i ncrease at least makes it difficult to believe t hat the secret 
ballot and registration law changes immediately led to markedly 
cleaner elections. As long as elections were close, stakes high, and 
corrupt ers ingenious, "reforms" seem t o  have had more effect on the 
nature than the level of fraud. 29 
Alt hough t he report ing of elect oral corruption was no doubt 
biased, our conclusions on t he change in t he nature of fraud at t he 
ballot box do not appear t o  be an artifact of syst ematic vagaries in 
t he data. Pre-election stories on expect ed deception were probably less 
trustworthy t han t hose which appeared aft er an election, for t he former 
were more likely t o  have been prophylactic, partisan, or speculat ive. 
That is to say, such predictions may have reflect ed att empts by editors 
to inhibit fraud by advertising it s possibility, efforts to rally the 
party faithful against t he allegedly corrupt opposition, or instances 
of uninhibited prognostication in an era before t he standards of media 
t rut hfulness were widely agreed upon. A change in the mix of pre-election 
t o  post-elect ion reports after 1890, t herefore, might undercut our 
conclusion. But as t able 7 shows, t here was no such statistically 
significant change. Moreover, if we cross-classify the nature of fraud 
reported by whether t he report preceded or succeeded the election in 
each period, we can see that t he report s of inflationary events seem 
most reliable (i.e. , the proportion occurring after the election was 
higher) for the pre-1890 period and the deflationary reports seem more 
reliable for t he post -1890 period (table 8). Our confidence in the 
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conclusions drawn from table 6 is therefore strengthened, because the 
30 crucial contrasts there were produced by the "hardest" data. 
Nor do partisan biases in reporting seem to have varied 
between the party-ballot and secret-ballot periods in a way which would 
impair our conclusions. As table 9 demonstrates, Republican newspapers 
rarely uncovered general election corruption in the GOP and Democrats 
were nearly as unlikely to broadcast allegations about tricks played by 
their brotherhood, while independent newspapers were more even-handed. 
Given these biases, the cells which do differ across the two panels of 
table 9 support our interpretation of table 6. Since the rural areas 
of New York state were predominately Republican, and since a good many 
farmers reportedly demanded payments for merely coming to the polls, 
we would expect Republicans to have engaged in relatively more vote-
buying and Democrats in comparatively more abstention-buying. If vote-
buying were in fact more prevalent in the earlier period and abstention-
buying relatively more common in the later period, we would anticipate 
that charges of Republican corruption would fall somewhat and accusations 
of Democratic deceit would rise from one era to the other. That is 
31 
precisely what we find if we look at the percentages in table 9. 
We draw three conclusions from our somewhat casual theoreti-
cal, but rigorous empirical inquiry. First, abstract theorizing must 
complement, not substitute for painstaking empirical work. Neither 
Burnham' s elite capture/proletarian alienation theory nor Converse's 
decline in rural corruption hy pothesis finds much resonance in the New 
York data. Careful scrutiny of relevant election returns as well as 
more "i mpressi oni stic" contemporary sources suggests the inadequacy, 
if not the incorrectness, of both explanations. Although we do not 
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claim to have offered a complete explanation for the decline in turnout, 
we have tried, through painstaking empirical work, to clarify what 
needs to be explained and offered a tentative hypothesis which we 
believe accounts for the pre-to-post-1890 shift in rural areas better 
than previous scholars' theories. Second, the hypothesis which we 
assert throws most light upon the data from election returns and the 
media is a variation of a rational voting model, not a social-psycholo-
gical model, and it melds the institutional and behavioral hypotheses 
instead of forcing what we believe is a false choice between them. In 
an era of institutional and behavioral instability, an explanation 
which treats as exogenous the behavioral causes of institutional 
changes or fails to trace the effects of such changes on the behavior 
of all actors -- not just voters, but also politicians -- cannot be 
comprehensive, but it is likely to be misleading.32 Third, our 
explanation, as well as those of Burham, Converse, and Rusk, deserve 
testing for other states, in other time periods, and perhaps with other 
kinds of data. As scholars have often noted, many of the most 
significant questions in political science can be approached most 
fruitfully by considering data not available from modern public opinion 
survey s. And the range of sources which can be systematically analysed, 
as we have tried to show by considering "literary" evidence in this 
paper, is not limited to official documents and election returns. 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
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in American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), 1149-52; Rusk, 
"Communications," ibid. , 1152-57; and the Rusk and Converse papers 
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The year 1870 was used as a starting date to avoid exogenous 
perturbations in both numerator and denominator resulting from 
the Civil War, and 1916 as a closing date because it was the last 
president ial year before the enfranchisement of women. 
Personal registration was required in New York and Brooklyn 
counties after 1866. See Laws of the State of New York, 1866, 
chapter 812; 1890, chapter 321; 1895, chapter 810; and 1908, 
chapter 521. 
The 1875 New York State Census gives figures for males over 21 
and "aliens. " We subtracted the latter from the former. Although 
the 1880 United States census is silent on the status of the foreign­
born and political squabbles prevented the state from conducting any 
more censuses, the 1890 United States Census gives statewide totals 
of males over 21 categorized by n ativity, and breaks down the 
foreign-born adult males into four categories: naturalized, first 
papers, alien, and unknown. Succeeding censuses give analogous 
figures aggregated at the county and state levels. To form the 
denominators in Figure 2, we added the naturalized to the native-
born, and also added a proportion of the unknowns equal to 
N 
, where N naturalized, F = first papers, and A alien. N + F + A  
7. 
Eliminating the unknowns entirely from the denominator raises 
the post-1890 turnout estimates by 2-3 percent, but does not 
change any substantive points. We linearly interpolated the 
figures from census to census. These figures differ somewhat 
from those Burnham published in Historical Statistics, Pt. 2 
(Washington: G.P.O., 1975), 1067-1079. Try as we might, 
we could not reproduce Burnham's turnout percentages. 
If we had separate electoral returns for each town, village, 
and rural area, we could determine the effects of the legal 
changes comprehensively. Since such returns are unavailable, 
we concentrated on the extreme cases. Regression estimates 
using the percentage of the population in each county covered 
by each registration scheme produce results quite similar 
to those given in Table 1. 
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8. The urban counties were Albany, Bronx (after 1914), Erie, Kings, 
Monroe, New York, Rensselaer, and Schenectady. The rural were 
Allegheny, Delaware, Essex, Lewis, Livingston, Orleans, 
Schoharie, Schuyler, Sullivan, Washington, Wayne, Wyoming, Yates. 
9. On Hughes, see Robert F. Wessner, Charles Evans Hughes: Politics 
and Reform in New York, 1905-1910 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1967), 252-348. The best study of the New 
York machine is still Harold F. Gosnell's Boss Platt and His 
New York Machine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923). 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American 
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1970), 71-134. 
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For a perceptive review of this literature, see Howard W. Allen, 
"Vote Fraud and the Validity of Election Data," an unpublished 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the Organization of 
American Historians, April 7, 1977. 
For an influential piece which illustrates the failings of the 
earlier literature, see J. J. McCook, "The Alarming Proportion 
of Venal Voters," The Forum, 14 (Sept. 1892), 1-13, 
reprinted in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: 
Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Books, 1970), 411-21. 
Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," 288, 290-91; 
and "Comment on Burnham's 'Theory and Voting Research,'" 1024-25. 
Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," 290. 
Nineteenth-century newspapers were much more openly partisan in 
editorials and especially in news coverage than are today's 
papers. On average, we examined 32 newspapers for each year. 
We chose the particular years so as to give us two presidential 
and two nonpresidential years before and after the election law 
changes of 1890, and scanned a few papers in 1908 to get a feel 
for the comparative allegations at a later date. For each year 
22 
and newspaper, we read roughly nine issues, centering on the 
election date for that year, since preliminary trials on larger 
time-spans had convinced us that there were very few stories on 
corruption published at other times, or that articles from 
other dates were very likely to be reprinted, at least in part, 
around election day. We concentrated on small-town newspapers 
because they were more likely to have first-hand reports of 
rural and town corruption. 
15. Albany Argus, Nov. 3, 1876. 
16. Albany Evening Journal, Nov. 2, 1885; Corning Democrat, 
Oct. 20, 1892. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Waterloo Observer, Nov. 11, 1891. 
Watkins Express, Nov. 13, 1879. 
Bernard R. Berelson et al., Voting (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1954), 110-115; William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, 
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J., 1973), 62-65. 
Elizabethtown Post, Nov. 18, 1880; Newburgh Daily Journal, 
Nov. 5, 1885; Elmira Daily Advertiser, Nov. 4, 1885; Orange 
County Press, Nov. 11, 1892. 
21. 
22. 
Thus, in succeeding tables, none of the material relates to 
New York City or to such upstate cities as Albany, Elmira, 
Syracuse, Rochester, Newburgh, Rome, Troy, Utica, Ithaca, or 
Poughkeepsie. 
Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," 286, and his 
"CollDllent," 1024. In the former, he asserts that before 1900 
"the subtraction of legitimate but undesired votes from the 
stock cast . • .  is virtually never mentioned." 
23 
23. Plattsburgh Republican, Nov. 10, 1888. 
24. New York Evening Post, Nov. 16, 1888. If electoral corruption 
is limited to acts which pervert the voter's judgment, it is 
difficult to characterize such payments as corrupt. Moreover, 
if an exogenous shift brought about by, say, a corrupt practices 
act decreased the general incidence of vote-buying, many of 
those who formerly demanded payment for their franchises would 
vote anyway. Thus, a decrease in vote-buying would not 
necessarily lead to as large a decline in turnout as might 
otherwise be expected. 
25. Two loopholes in the law allowed managers to tell how someone 
had voted. Voters could be paid to use "pas ters" to blot out 
the names of unfavored candidates, or they could declare 
physical handicaps or illiteracy and receive assistance from 
26. 
24 
part y workers in making their ballots. But "pasters" were 
unwieldy, especially in elect ions where there were many offices 
at stake, and false claims of disabilit y were difficult t o  carry 
off in small face-t o-face communities. On "paster" frauds, 
see Harmnondsport Herold, Oct. 17, 1891; New York Tribune, Nov. 4, 
1891. On an extraordinary and suspicious number of declarat ions 
of physical disabilit y, see Bath Plaindealer, Nov. 7, 1891. 
In fact, it can be argued a priori t hat the number of purchased 
voters would rise as t he proportion of contracts which were pact s t o  
vote declined and t he percent age composed o f  nonvot ing agreements 
rose. First , compact s against voting would not require non­
politicians to spend t ime t raveling t o  t he polls, and t herefore, 
a nonvoting contract would not include the value of foregone 
production. Second, if a polit ician convinced an opposit ion 
partisan t o  vote for him, he increased his margin by two votes, 
but if he persuaded an opponent not to vote, he gained only 
one vote. Assuming t hat funds available, the wort h of a vote, 
and t he willingness to corrupt and to be corrupted remained 
constant across elections, then, one would expect individual 
payoffs to decline after 1890, but the volume of payoffs t o  
increase. On the other hand, as the value of a purchasable 
vote decreased, a politician might shift available funds int o 
other channels of corruption -- for inst ance, into buying 
electoral officials instead of voters -- or into more legiti-
mate forms of :ictivity, such as providing transportation to the
polls. 
27. 
28. 
New York Times, Oct. 18, 1890; Nov. 2, 1894; Sept . 28, 1900. 
25 
Since nineteent h-cent ury newspaper edit ors regularly exchanged 
copies with a wide range of ot her edit ors, any st riking report 
was likely to crop up in many papers. Sorting out separate 
event s was usually possibloe, for one paper would frequently 
mention that it had t aken a report from anot her paper, or a 
report wit hout a byline would explicitly refer t o  event s out­
side the town or county where t he newspaper was published. More 
general report s -- say, one that stated that there was a 
considerable amount of vote-buying in upstate rural areas in a 
cert ain election -- could not always be t raced to a particular 
source, and t herefore produce some duplication in the measurement 
of events. 
29. Polit ical scient ist s have long been aware of allegat ions of t he 
continuation of ballot fraud in New York after the passage of 
t he secret ballot law. See, e.g. , Gosnell, Boss Platt,  145-47, 348. 
JO. If we subt ract t he ent ries in the pre-1890 subt able for the 
inflat ionary and deflationary rows from those for the corresponding 
rows in t he post -1890 subtable and comput e Pearson's Chi-square 
on the resultin� 2x2 table, we find t hat t he probabilit y that t he 
differences could have occurred by chance is less than . 000002. 
In other words, we can be very certain that the pre-1890 infla­
tionary and the post-1890 deflat ionary references are more 
26 
reliable than the post-1890 inflationary and pre-1890 deflationary 
reports. This is precisely the pattern which we would expect if 
there were in fact few instances of deflationary fraud before 
1890, and if expectations of inflationary corruption were based 
on past as well as present experience after 1890. That is, if 
there were a time lag before newspapers realized that inflationary 
fraud was less likely than before the institution of the secret 
ballot, they would continue to predict the occurrence of 
inflationary fraud, but would find relatively less of it in 
post-election stories. 
31. One may draw the same conclusion as in the text from the following 
table, which is based on the same data as in Table 9. 
Pre-1890 
Partisanship of 
Newspapers Inflation Deflation Uncertain 
R 29 6 12 
D 58 1 15 
Ind. 12 0 9 
Post-1890 
Partisanship of 
Newspapers Inflation Deflation Uncertain 
R 23 23 21 
D 59 24 31 
Ind. 33 9 21 
32. 
27 
Thus, Jerrold G. Rusk and John J. Stucker, seemingly ignorant of 
the potential disfranchising effect of the secret ballot as well 
as the intent of the "reform's" Southern backers, overemphasize 
the effect on turnout of the poll tax and other laws because they 
ignore that of the secret ballot, which functioned as a literacy 
test. Compare their "The Effect of the Southern System of Election 
Laws on Voting Participation: A Reply to V. O. Key, Jr. , "  in Joel 
H. Silbey et al., The History of American Electoral Behavior 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 198-252, with J. 
Morgan Kousser, "Post-Reconstruction Suffrage Restrictions in 
Tennessee: A New Look at the V. 0. Key Thesis," Political Science 
Quarterly, 88 (1973), 655-83, and The Shaping of Southern Politics: 
Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 
1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 51-60. 
We have not attempted to present here a study of the 
origins of the New York secret-ballot law, but for some suggestive 
intimations as to the purposes of Northern proponents of such laws, 
see Cayuga Chief, Nov. 8, 1890; Kousser, Shaping of Southern 
Politics, 52-53; L. E. Fredman, The Australian Ballot: The Story 
of an American Reform (East Lansing, Mich. : Michigan State University 
Press, 1968), 49-54, 85; Joseph P. Harris, Registration of Voters 
in the United States (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1929), 
72-78; and the forthcoming Ph. D. thesis on New Jersey Progressivism 
by John F. Reynolds of Rutgers University. 
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Table l; Turnout in New York Gubernat orial Elections, in Exclusively 
Rural & Wholly Urban Count ies, 1870-1916 
Year Rural* Urban* Rural** Urban** 
1870 77. 3 56. 4 
1872 79.1 59. 7 
1874 74.2 55. 2 
1876 89. 3 68. 0 
1879 76.0 54. 9 
1882 70. 9 55. 5 
1885 76. 2 56. 3 
1888 90.2 69. 7 
1891 74. 7 58. 5 
1894 74.8 60. 3 
1896 84. 1 64. 0 
1898 75.5 58. 4 
1900 84. 4 64. 4 87. 7 78. 7 
1902 71. 1 54. 5 74. 6 69.4 
1904 82. 0 59. 2 86.6 78. 2 
1906 69.3 52. 0 73. 7 71. 0 
1908 80. 7 52. 2 86. 6 73.5 
1910 67. 8 43.3 73. 2 62. 7 
1912 69. 6 46.1 74. 9 66. 0 
1914 60.2 39. 2 64. 5  55. 5 
1916 68. 9 44.3 73. 6 62. 1 
*Denominator = all adult males 
**Denominat or = native whit e + native Negro + nat uralized foreign-born 
whit e + ([st atus unknown foreign-born] x [% of known status foreign­
born who were nat uralized in each county]) 
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Table 2: Reductions in Absolute Levels of Turnout, Rural and Urban Areas 
Rural 
6.2 
Rural 
15.S 
Decline* 
Decline* 
*Denominator 
of New York State, 1900-1916 
Presidential Elections 
Urban 
17.S 
Gubernatorial Elections 
Urban 
20. 1 
all adult males 
Decline** 
Rural Urban 
4. 4 12. 9 
Decline** 
Rural Urban 
14. 2 16.6 
**Denominator = native white + native Negro + naturalized foreign-born 
white+ (status unknown foreign-born x % of known status foreign-born 
who are naturalized in each county) 
Table 3: Levels of Roll-Off (Presidential-Gubernatorial Turnout) in 
Rural & Urban Areas of New York State, 1908-1916 
Year Rural* Urban* Rural** Urban** 
1908 -0. 1 0. 0 -0.2 0. 0 
1912 4. 4 0. 2 4. 7 0.2 
1916 9. 2 2.6 9. 8 3. 7 
*Denominator all adult males 
**Denominator = native white + native Negro + naturalized foreign-born 
white + (status unknown foreign-born x % of known status foreign-born 
who are naturalized in each county) 
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Table 6 :  The Nature of Rural Corruption Before 
and After the Secret Ballot* 
I. Number of Events Reported 
Pre-1890 Post-1890 
Inflationary 90 (68. 7%) 94 (43. 7%) 
Deflationary 3 (2. 3%) 54 (25. 1%) 
Uncertain 34 (26. 0%) 67 (31. 2%) 
Total 131 (100%) 215 (100%) 
II. Pearson ' s  Chi-Square Statistic for 6 -fold & 4-fold tables 
Probability of Null Hypothesis 
Variables Chi::§.9.uare Less Than 
I x D x U 36. 26 .001 
I x D 34.99 .001 
D x U 16.39 .001 
I x U 6. 17 .02 
I x (U + D) 23.6 7 .001 
(I + U) x D 29.76 .001 
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Table 7: No Significant Difference in the Proportion of Events Reported 
Before and After Election Day Between the Two Periods 
Pre-1890 Post-1890 
Pre-Election 46 (36.2%) 81 (63.8%) 
Post-Election _g_(40.3% ) ...2.L(59. 7%) 
Total 108 173 
2 
= . 4799 P(x
2) = . 5115 x 
Tab le 8: Number of Events Cross- Classifie d by Pre- and Post-Election 
Source, Nature of Corruption, and Period 
Pre-1890 
Nature of 
Corruption Pre-Election Post-Election 
I 27 (35. 5% ) 49 (64. 5%) 
D 2 (66. 7% ) 1 (33. 3% ) 
u 17 (58. 6%) 12 (41. 4% ) 
Total 46 (42. 6% ) 62 (57. 4% ) 
Post-1890 
Nature of 
Corruption Pre-Election Post-Election 
I 39 (52. 0% ) 36 (48. 0% ) 
D 18 (43. 9r- ) 23 (56. 1% ) 
u 24 (42. 1% ) 33 (57 . 9% ) 
Total Bl (46. 8% )  92 (53. 2% ) 
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Tab le 9: Newspaper Reporting Biases Did Not Differ Very Much In the Two 
Periods (N's in Parenthesis)* 
Panel I: Pre-1890 Reports Ab out 
Partisanship 
of Newspapers R D Both** Unc. ** Total 
R 1 (0. 7) 40 (28.2) 0 6 (4. 2) 47 (33. 1) 
D 69 (48. 6) 1 (. 7) 0 4 (2. 8) 74 (52. 1) 
Ind. ** 3 (2. 1) 1 (. 7) 5 (3. 5) 12 (8. 5) 21 (14. 8) 
Total 73 (51 . 4) 42 (29. 6) 5 (3. 5) 22 (15. 5) 144 (100. 0) 
Panel II: Post-1890 Reports About 
Partisanship 
of Newspapers R D Both Unc. Total 
R 0 63 (25.8) 0 4 (1. 6) 67 (27 . 4) 
D 85 (34. 8) 13 (5. 3) 7 (2. 9) 9 (3.7) 114 (46. 7) 
Ind. 34 (13.9) 17 (7.0) 4 (1. 6) 8 (3. 3) 63 (25. 8) 
Total 119 (48. 7) 93 (38.1) 11 (4. 5) 21 (8. 6) 244 (100. 0) 
*The numbers here reflect all reports, including duplicates of reports from other 
newspapers, for all years, including discussions of previous elections which appeared 
during an election year. (Eliminating such pre vious-year reports makes no substantive 
difference in the tab le. ) The (1, 1, 1) cell means that in the election years before 
1890, only one report of Republican corruption appeared in any of the Republican 
papers whi ch we read. The other cells may be interprete d analogously. 
**"Ind. " =  independent, independent-Democratic, or independent-Republican 
"Both" = allegations made e xplicitly ab out b oth parties. 
"Unc. " = allegations in which no political party was specifically mentioned. 
